What FD&C Act Section 524b Actually Requires
Discover how Finite State's Next Gen Platform can help medical device manufacturers navigate FDA's new cybersecurity regulation, Section 524B.

Finite State Team
Section 524B has required the same four things since March 2023. The guidance interpreting it has been replaced three times since then, most recently in February 2026.
FDA 524B requirements come down to four obligations for any sponsor submitting a cyber device for premarket review: a plan to monitor and address postmarket vulnerabilities, including coordinated vulnerability disclosure; processes that give reasonable assurance the device is cybersecure, with a two-speed patch commitment; a software bill of materials covering commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf components; and anything else FDA later requires by regulation.
The statute is short. What makes it hard is that most of what gets written about medical device cybersecurity compliance describes a guidance document rather than the law, and the guidance keeps moving. Four final premarket guidance documents in twelve years, three of them since 524B took effect. Section 524B(b) has not changed a word.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Enacted | December 29, 2022. Pub. L. 117-328, Div. FF, Title III, Sec. 3305(a) |
| Effective | March 29, 2023 |
| Acceptance enforcement | Since October 1, 2023, missing 524B information can stop a submission before substantive review (RTA, or technical screening for eSTAR submissions) |
| Postmarket enforcement | Failing to comply with 524B(b)(2) is a prohibited act under 21 U.S.C. 331(q)(3) |
| Applies to | Cyber devices in 510(k), De Novo, PMA, PDP, and HDE submissions, plus PMA and HDE supplements |
| Submission format | eSTAR required for 510(k) since October 1, 2023, and De Novo since October 1, 2025 |
| Current guidance | February 3, 2026. Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions, docket FDA-2021-D-1158 |
Below: the statute and what compliance means, the four requirements, the cyber device test, which submissions trigger it, the documentation FDA expects to see, how to build the SBOM, every guidance version since 2014, what changed from the 2014 guidance, and why 524A is not what you think.
The guidance is the moving part. The statute is the durable one. Build the program against the statute.
What is FDA Section 524B?
Section 524B is the part of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that turned FDA's medical device cybersecurity recommendations into legal requirements. It is codified at 21 U.S.C. 360n-2, took effect March 29, 2023, and applies to 510(k), De Novo, PMA, PDP, and HDE submissions for cyber devices filed on or after that date.
Section 524B compliance, defined. A sponsor complies with 524B when its premarket submission for a cyber device contains the information the statute requires to show each 524B(b) obligation is met: the postmarket vulnerability plan, the cybersecure processes and patch commitment, and the SBOM. Compliance is judged on the submission's contents, and for (b)(2) it continues after clearance.
FDA had been publishing premarket cybersecurity guidance since 2014. None of it was independently enforceable. Congress added 524B through Public Law 117-328, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, at Division FF, Title III, Section 3305(a). Title III of Division FF is the Food and Drug Omnibus Reform Act, or FDORA.
Calling 524B a product of "the omnibus bill" is technically true and useless in a submission, so use the citation.
Two dates matter. The section took effect 90 days after enactment, per section 3305(d). Enforcement at the acceptance stage arrived separately. In a Federal Register notice published March 30, 2023, FDA said it "generally intends not to issue 'refuse to accept' (RTA) decisions for premarket submissions submitted for cyber devices based solely on information required by section 524B of the FD&C Act before October 1, 2023."
That date is the one to understand. A 524B deficiency is not a disagreement with a reviewer about whether your controls are adequate. It is the submission failing to get into the queue. For 510(k) and De Novo submissions, which now arrive through eSTAR, the gate is technical screening rather than a separate RTA review, with the same practical result.
What are the FDA 524B requirements? The four obligations in Section 524B(b)
The FDA 524B requirements are four obligations in Section 524B(b): (1) a plan to monitor, identify, and address postmarket vulnerabilities, including coordinated vulnerability disclosure; (2) processes providing reasonable assurance the device and related systems are cybersecure, plus scheduled and out-of-cycle patches; (3) an SBOM covering commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf components; and (4) any further requirements FDA sets by regulation.

Every summary lists those four. Most flatten the second one, which is where the two patch clocks live and the only one that carries a prohibited-act hook.
| Provision | What the statute requires | What it means for the submission |
|---|---|---|
| 524B(b)(1) | A plan to monitor, identify, and address postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exploits in a reasonable time, including coordinated vulnerability disclosure and related procedures | A vulnerability management plan with a named intake path, not a policy statement |
| 524B(b)(2) | Processes and procedures providing "a reasonable assurance that the device and related systems are cybersecure," plus postmarket updates and patches | Secure development evidence across the lifecycle, plus a defensible patch commitment |
| 524B(b)(3) | "a software bill of materials, including commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf software components" | An SBOM covering everything in the device, not just first-party code |
| 524B(b)(4) | Compliance with "such other requirements as the Secretary may require through regulation" | FDA's authority to add obligations by rulemaking later |
Requirement one names coordinated vulnerability disclosure inside the statutory sentence. CVD is not an extra that guidance bolted on. It sits in the law, next to the monitoring obligation.
The document is the easy half. The obligation is a staffed intake path, which raises a question a policy PDF cannot answer: who owns the disclosure queue this week, by name?
Requirement two carries two clocks. Patches must address "(A) on a reasonably justified regular cycle, known unacceptable vulnerabilities" and "(B) as soon as possible out of cycle, critical vulnerabilities that could cause uncontrolled risks." You have to be able to defend which bucket a finding lands in, and "reasonably justified" means the justification is an artifact you can produce. Triaging by exploitability rather than severity alone is what makes that defensible at portfolio scale.
Notice what the statute does not say: a number of days. The 30-day and 60-day figures that circulate in vendor content come from FDA's 2016 postmarket guidance. There, for uncontrolled risks, they are conditions under which FDA does not intend to enforce 21 CFR Part 806 reporting: customer communication and a remediation plan within 30 days of learning of the vulnerability, and a validated, deployable fix within 60. They are not 524B deadlines.
Requirement two also reaches past clearance. FDORA added paragraph (q)(3) to Section 301 of the Act, making "the failure to comply with any requirement under section 360n-2(b)(2)" a prohibited act. The (b)(1) plan and the (b)(3) SBOM are not named there. The processes and the patching are.
A cleared device whose patch commitment quietly lapses is a compliance problem, not just a stale document.
Requirement three names the categories an SBOM has to cover and says nothing about format. Every format expectation you have read comes from guidance. Requirement four is the rulemaking hook. As of October 2026, we found no regulation issued under it.
How does Section 524B define a cyber device?
Section 524B(c) defines a cyber device as a device that (1) "includes software validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor as a device or in a device," (2) "has the ability to connect to the internet," and (3) "contains any such technological characteristics validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor that could be vulnerable to cybersecurity threats." All three prongs must be met.
Two beliefs put more devices out of scope than the statute does. The product does not ship with connectivity enabled. The risky code came from a supplier. Neither survives the test.
Prong two is about capability. The text says "has the ability to connect to the internet," not "connects to the internet" and not "is configured to connect." A device with a service port, a paired gateway, or a connectivity path a customer can turn on has the ability whether or not anyone uses it.
Prongs one and three hinge on the same phrase: "validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor." You do not have to have written the software. Authorizing a supplier's component into your device makes that component yours for the purpose of this definition. That phrase is also why the SBOM requirement is harder than it reads.
Fail any prong and 524B does not attach. Your quality system obligations do, and so does the guidance, whose scope is broader than the statute's: it covers devices with software, firmware, or programmable logic whether or not they connect. Falling outside 524B is not falling outside scrutiny.
Which submissions do 524B requirements apply to?

Section 524B applies to premarket submissions for cyber devices filed on or after March 29, 2023: 510(k)s including Special and Abbreviated 510(k)s, De Novo requests, PMAs, Product Development Protocols, and Humanitarian Device Exemptions, plus PMA and HDE supplements. It does not reach submissions filed before that date, and a device already on the market stays outside it only until its next covered filing.
The overlooked entries are the supplements and the Special 510(k), the exact routes a change to an existing product travels. FDA is direct about the corollary: if a previously authorized cyber device is modified in a way that requires premarket review, 524B applies to that new submission.
So the grandfather clause is a function of product inactivity. A device sits outside 524B for exactly as long as you file nothing for it. Any product line under active development walks into scope on its own schedule, and the trigger is an engineering decision rather than a regulatory event.
Depth is calibrated separately from scope. FDA notes that the information it recommends for modified cyber devices "will generally differ based on the type of change," and on whether the change affects the device's cybersecurity. A submission pulls you into 524B. What the change touches decides how much you show.
The gate itself now runs through eSTAR. FDA has required eSTAR for 510(k) submissions since October 1, 2023, and for De Novo submissions since October 1, 2025. FDA says eSTAR submissions are not expected to undergo RTA review; they go through technical screening instead. An incomplete eSTAR can be placed on a technical screening hold for up to 180 days, and if no replacement arrives in that window, FDA treats the submission as withdrawn.
If a product has a submission anywhere on its two-year roadmap, treat it as in scope today. The artifacts take longer to build than the submission takes to file.
What documentation does a 524B premarket submission need?
A 524B premarket submission should include a security risk management report, threat model, cybersecurity risk assessment, SBOM with support and end-of-support data, assessment of known vulnerabilities and unresolved anomalies, four security architecture views, security control documentation, cybersecurity testing reports including penetration testing, vulnerability metrics, cybersecurity labeling, and a cybersecurity management plan.
That list comes from the February 2026 guidance, not the statute. The statute names four outcomes. The guidance names the deliverables a reviewer expects to see as evidence of them.
| Deliverable | What FDA expects | Most directly supports |
|---|---|---|
| Security risk management report | Summary of methods, residual risk conclusion, and traceability across the documents below | (b)(2) |
| Threat model | Whole-system scope, stated assumptions (FDA calls hospital networks "inherently hostile"), supply chain, update, and decommissioning risks | (b)(2) |
| Cybersecurity risk assessment | Exploitability-based scoring, acceptance criteria, transfer of security risks into safety risk. Vulnerabilities in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog "should be designed out of the device" | (b)(2) |
| SBOM and third-party components | Machine-readable SBOM, per-component support level and end-of-support date, known vulnerability assessment, plan for components that lose support | (b)(3) |
| Interoperability | Cybersecurity risks and controls at interfaces with other devices, healthcare IT, and general-purpose platforms | (b)(2) |
| Unresolved anomalies | Security assessment of software anomalies present at submission | (b)(2) |
| Architecture views | Global System, Multi-Patient Harm, Updatability/Patchability, and Security Use Case views, each with diagrams and explanation | (b)(2) |
| Security controls | Requirements and evidence across eight categories: authentication, authorization, cryptography, integrity, confidentiality, event detection and logging, resiliency and recovery, updatability and patchability | (b)(2) |
| Cybersecurity testing | Security requirements testing, threat mitigation testing, vulnerability testing (fuzzing, attack surface analysis, SCA, static and dynamic analysis), and independent penetration testing | (b)(2) |
| Metrics | Percentage of identified vulnerabilities patched, time from identification to patch, time from patch availability to field deployment | (b)(1), (b)(2) |
| Labeling | Recommended controls, ports and interfaces, SBOM access, update procedures, end-of-support information, decommissioning | (b)(2), indirectly |
| Cybersecurity management plan | Responsible personnel, monitoring sources and frequency, CVD process, patch timelines and justification, customer communication | (b)(1) |
The right-hand column is our mapping. It follows Section VII of the guidance, which ties the (b)(1) plan to the cybersecurity management plan and the (b)(3) SBOM to the SBOM section. Labeling rests mainly on FDA's misbranding authority, with only a cross-reference to (b)(2).
Two rows deserve more attention than they get. The cybersecurity management plan is how you demonstrate (b)(1). FDA asks for it in the premarket submission itself, which means the postmarket process has to exist, with owners, before the device is cleared.
The architecture views are where thin submissions show. FDA recommends all four at minimum, and where a view does not apply, it expects an explanation of why. A Multi-Patient Harm view is hard to fake: it asks how the system behaves when an attacker compromises one device and reaches for the fleet.
The guidance is nonbinding. You can take a different approach. But the statutory items are not optional, and a reviewer who cannot find the evidence for them in the shape they expect will ask for it, on the clock.
How to prepare an SBOM for 524B, and where it breaks
To prepare an SBOM for 524B, inventory every software component in the shipped device, including upstream dependencies; record the NTIA baseline fields for each; add each component's support level and end-of-support date; assess known vulnerabilities against it; and deliver it in a machine-readable, industry-accepted format such as SPDX or CycloneDX.
- Scope it to the device, not the repository. The statute covers commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf software. The guidance adds "the upstream software dependencies that are required/depended upon by proprietary, purchased/licensed, and open-source software."
- Record the baseline fields. FDA asks for SBOMs consistent with the baseline attributes in NTIA's October 2021 Framing Software Component Transparency document: author name, timestamp, supplier name, component name, version string, component hash, unique identifier, and relationship.
- Add lifecycle data per component. FDA asks for "the software level of support provided through monitoring and maintenance from the software component manufacturer (e.g., the software is actively maintained, no longer maintained, abandoned)" and "the software component's end-of-support date." These can sit in the SBOM or an addendum.
- Assess known vulnerabilities. Every known vulnerability in a listed component needs a safety and security assessment and the controls that address it. KEV entries get designed out.
- Ship it machine-readable. FDA does not mandate SPDX or CycloneDX by name. Both satisfy the expectation.
One divergence to plan around. On July 29, 2026, CISA, NSA, and FBI published the 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), which builds on NTIA's 2021 minimum elements and adds fields including component hash, license, SBOM tool name, and SBOM generation context. Component hash already appears in the NTIA framing document FDA cites; license, tool name, and generation context do not. We found no FDA statement adopting the CISA version as of October 2026.
Building to the CISA superset costs little now and avoids a rework if FDA updates its reference. For the field-by-field view, see our guide to FDA SBOM requirements for medical devices.
The SBOM you cannot build from source
Most teams generate the SBOM from the build. It comes out clean, it validates against the schema, and it describes a different artifact than the one FDA is asked to clear.
Your build manifest lists what you declared. The binary contains what shipped. When a contract manufacturer swaps a library version, a supplier image carries an undeclared dependency, or a component arrives statically linked inside a supplier's blob, the manifest cannot know. This is why application security SCA tools struggle on firmware: they were built to read repositories, and a device is not a repository.
FDA has conceded the hard part, stating that "manufacturers may not have control of source code due to licensing restrictions, terms of supplier agreements, or other challenges." Source code is not required. Knowing what is in the component, and planning around its end of support, still is. Analyzing the shipped image closes that gap without source or supplier cooperation, and it is how you check a supplier's SBOM against the binary they shipped you.
If your device is entirely first-party code you compile, a manifest-derived SBOM may hold up. If any of it arrived from a supplier as a binary, it will not.
Latest FDA cybersecurity guidance: every version from 2014 to 2026
The latest FDA guidance on medical device cybersecurity is Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions, issued February 3, 2026. It supersedes the June 27, 2025 version and aligns the guidance with the Quality Management System Regulation, which took effect February 2, 2026.
A premarket checklist that cites an earlier version cites a superseded document.
| Date | Document | Status | What it did |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 2, 2014 | Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices | Final, superseded 2023 | First premarket expectations; nonbinding |
| Dec 28, 2016 | Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices | Final, current | Controlled vs uncontrolled risk; postmarket reporting expectations |
| Oct 18, 2018 | Premarket draft (update to the 2014 guidance) | Draft, superseded | Tier 1/Tier 2 risk model and a "cybersecurity bill of materials" |
| Apr 8, 2022 | Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions (draft) | Draft, superseded | Dropped risk tiers; replaced CBOM with SBOM; introduced SPDF framing |
| Sep 27, 2023 | Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions | Final, superseded | Replaced the 2014 guidance |
| Mar 13, 2024 | Select Updates for the Premarket Cybersecurity Guidance: Section 524B of the FD&C Act | Draft, finalized 2025 | Proposed a dedicated 524B section |
| Jun 27, 2025 | Same title as the 2023 final, revised | Final, superseded | Added Section VII on 524B, cyber device scope, and modifications |
| Feb 3, 2026 | Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions | Final, current | QMSR alignment |
What the February 2026 revision did not do matters as much as what it did. It replaced references to the old Quality System Regulation with QMSR and ISO 13485:2016 clauses. According to published analyses, it did not add new technical expectations.
If your submission was built against the June 2025 guidance, the content holds. The cross-references do not. The 2016 postmarket guidance has never been replaced, and the current premarket guidance still points to it.
FDA 524B vs the 2014 cybersecurity guidance: what changed
The 2014 guidance recommended five things, none of them enforceable: a hazard analysis, a traceability matrix linking risks to controls, a plan for updates and patches, a summary of software integrity controls, and instructions for use covering recommended controls. Section 524B made a postmarket plan, cybersecure processes, patching, and an SBOM legal requirements, and the current guidance expanded the expected documentation from five items to more than ten.
| Dimension | 2014 premarket guidance | Section 524B and current guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Legal force | Recommendation only | Statutory requirement; submission can be refused or held at acceptance; (b)(2) failure is a prohibited act |
| SBOM | Not requested | Required by statute, with support and end-of-support data per guidance |
| Risk analysis | Hazard analysis and traceability matrix | Threat model, exploitability-based risk assessment, KEV designed out |
| Architecture | Not requested | Four security architecture views |
| Testing | Not a listed deliverable | Requirements, threat mitigation, vulnerability, and independent penetration testing |
| Postmarket | Summary plan for updates | Statutory plan with CVD, management plan, metrics, two patch cadences |
| Framework | NIST Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover | Secure Product Development Framework integrated with the QMS |
The legal change is the bigger one. In 2014, a sponsor could answer a cybersecurity request by arguing for a different approach, because a recommendation is all a guidance document can be. FDA's leverage ran through its general safety and effectiveness review. Moving the core obligations into statute and attaching them to the acceptance decision removed that room to argue.
If your premarket templates still look like a 2014 hazard analysis with a traceability matrix attached, they describe a submission FDA stopped expecting three years ago.
Why the FDA introduced Section 524B
Section 524B closed a gap between rising exposure and a recommendation-only regime. A 2026 Frontiers in Digital Health analysis counted four FDA medical device cybersecurity safety communications from 2013 through 2017 and fourteen from 2018 through January 2025. Until March 2023, FDA's premarket cybersecurity expectations lived only in guidance a sponsor could argue with.
That analysis covered all eighteen FDA cybersecurity safety communications from June 2013 through January 2025, and its author rated 94% of them high-risk. The honest counterweight belongs here too. The same paper notes that, per FDA, no patient injuries or fatalities have been reported.
The case for 524B was never a body count. Exposure kept widening while FDA's premarket expectations stayed optional.
In January 2025, CISA published advisory ICSMA-25-030-01 on the Contec CMS8000 patient monitor, alongside an FDA safety communication. Claroty's Team82 had examined the firmware and found hardcoded public IP addresses used for firmware updates and patient data transmission, then demonstrated root code execution by impersonating the update address. Team82 pushed back on the "backdoor" framing CISA and FDA used and called it insecure design instead.
That distinction is the useful part. The finding was a design decision sitting in shipped firmware, and nothing short of examining that firmware would have surfaced it. Section 524B did not raise the bar. It made the existing bar a condition of entry.
FDA 524A vs FDA 524B: what the difference actually is
Section 524A of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 360n-1, is a drug provision: it grants priority review to qualified infectious disease products and was added in July 2012. It has nothing to do with devices or cybersecurity. Section 524B, 21 U.S.C. 360n-2, is the device cybersecurity provision, added in December 2022. The shared number reflects position in the Act, not a related rule.
| FD&C Act section | U.S. Code | Title | Added |
|---|---|---|---|
| Section 524 | 21 U.S.C. 360n | Priority review to encourage treatments for tropical diseases | Pub. L. 110-85, Title XI, Sec. 1102, Sept. 27, 2007 |
| Section 524A | 21 U.S.C. 360n-1 | Priority review for qualified infectious disease products | Pub. L. 112-144, Title VIII, Sec. 802(a), July 9, 2012 |
| Section 524B | 21 U.S.C. 360n-2 | Ensuring Cybersecurity of Devices | Pub. L. 117-328, Div. FF, Title III, Sec. 3305(a), Dec. 29, 2022 |
Letters get appended in the order provisions are added to the Act, not by subject. Section 524 is the tropical disease priority review voucher program from 2007. Section 524A came in through the GAIN Act provisions of FDASIA in 2012 and rewards developers of qualifying antibacterial and antifungal drugs with faster review.
The practical use is diagnostic. If a checklist, a compliance guide, or a vendor datasheet claims to address "524A cybersecurity requirements," the author has read neither provision. There is no 524A obligation to reconcile with your 524B package.
Key takeaways
- Effective March 29, 2023, at 21 U.S.C. 360n-2. Acceptance-stage enforcement began October 1, 2023.
- Three prongs, all required. Prong two asks whether the device can connect to the internet, not whether it does.
- Four requirements. A vulnerability management plan with CVD, cybersecure processes with a two-tier patch commitment, an SBOM, and future rulemaking.
- (b)(2) is a prohibited act if you fail it. The patch commitment survives clearance.
- The guidance names the evidence. Threat model, four architecture views, testing, metrics, labeling, and a management plan, all in the premarket submission.
- The obligation attaches to the submission, not the device. A pre-2023 clearance holds only until the next filing.
- February 2026 is the current guidance, and it changed QMS references, not technical expectations.
- Section 524A is unrelated. It is a 2012 drug priority review provision.
One first move. Pull the SBOM you would file today and check two fields on every third-party component: support status and end-of-support date. A blank field, or one inherited from a supplier questionnaire, is your gap.
See how we approach medical device cybersecurity, or we can walk a product through with you.
FAQ
What is Section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act?
Section 524B, 21 U.S.C. 360n-2, titled "Ensuring Cybersecurity of Devices," requires sponsors of premarket submissions for cyber devices to provide a postmarket vulnerability management plan, secure design and maintenance processes with a patch commitment, and a software bill of materials. Congress added it through FDORA in December 2022, and it took effect March 29, 2023.
Is FDA 524B a law or a guidance?
It is a law. Public Law 117-328 added Section 524B to the FD&C Act. The February 2026 premarket cybersecurity guidance is not a law: it states FDA's current thinking on how to demonstrate compliance and binds no one. FDA's Quality Management System Regulation, effective February 2, 2026, is a third thing: a binding regulation.
What is a cyber device under FDA 524B?
A device that includes software validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor, has the ability to connect to the internet, and contains technological characteristics the sponsor authorized that could be vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. All three prongs must be met, and the connectivity prong turns on capability, not configuration.

Does FDA 524B apply retroactively to devices already on the market?
No. FDA states the requirements do not apply to a submission filed before March 29, 2023. But the obligation attaches to the submission rather than the device, so modifying a cleared cyber device in a way that requires premarket review brings it into scope.
What documentation is required for a 524B premarket submission?
The statute requires the plan, process evidence, and SBOM. The February 2026 guidance describes how FDA expects to see them: a risk management report, threat model, risk assessment, SBOM with support data, four architecture views, control evidence, testing including penetration testing, metrics, labeling, and a cybersecurity management plan. The documentation section above maps each item to 524B(b).
Is violating Section 524B a prohibited act?
Partly. FDORA added 21 U.S.C. 331(q)(3), which makes failure to comply with any requirement under 524B(b)(2) a prohibited act. That provision covers the cybersecure design and maintenance processes and the patching obligations. The (b)(1) vulnerability plan and the (b)(3) SBOM are not named in (q)(3); they are enforced mainly at the acceptance stage.
What changed in the February 2026 FDA cybersecurity guidance?
The February 3, 2026 revision, which supersedes the June 27, 2025 version, retitled the guidance around the Quality Management System Regulation and replaced old Quality System Regulation references with ISO 13485:2016 clauses. Published analyses report no new technical cybersecurity expectations. The 524B content added in June 2025 carries forward.
What is the difference between FDA 524A and FDA 524B?
They are unrelated provisions that sit next to each other in the FD&C Act. Section 524A, added July 2012, grants priority review to qualified infectious disease products and concerns drugs. Section 524B, added December 2022, governs device cybersecurity. Letters are appended chronologically, not by subject.
What SBOM format does the FDA require for 524B?
FDA asks for a machine-readable SBOM in an industry-accepted format, consistent with the baseline attributes in NTIA's October 2021 SBOM framing document. It does not mandate CycloneDX or SPDX by name, though both satisfy the expectation. CISA published updated 2026 Minimum Elements on July 29, 2026; FDA's guidance has not yet referenced them. Our FDA SBOM requirements guide covers the fields in detail.
What happens if a 524B submission is missing the SBOM?
The SBOM is a statutory requirement under 524B(b)(3), so its absence is an acceptance-stage problem rather than a review-stage debate. A PMA or other non-eSTAR submission can receive an RTA decision. An incomplete eSTAR can sit on a technical screening hold for up to 180 days, after which FDA treats it as withdrawn.
Can the FDA exempt a device from 524B?
The statute allows it. Section 524B(d) authorizes FDA to identify devices or categories of devices exempt from the section and requires FDA to publish that list in the Federal Register. As of October 2026, we found no published exemption list, so assume no exemption applies unless FDA has confirmed one for your device type.

Finite State Team
The Finite State team brings together experts in cybersecurity, embedded systems, and software supply chain risk to help connected device manufacturers secure their products and comply with evolving global regulations.